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Shareholder Democracy and the Economic
Purpose of the Corporation
Donald J. Smythe*
I. Introduction
Interdisciplinary scholars often speak at cross-purposes. At times, their
efforts may elicit little more than bemused indifference. But scholars with an
interest in the corporation clearly need to communicate across disciplinary
boundaries. We will never have a complete understanding of the corporation as
a social, political, and economic entity unless we understand it coherently in all
its dimensions, and we will never understand it coherently in all its dimensions
unless we examine it rigorously from all perspectives. History is a source from
which scholars across the humanities and social sciences draw insight, and so a
symposium on understanding corporate law through history provides a rare
opportunity for scholars from various disciplines to exchange alternative points
of view.
Colleen Dunlavy has undertaken an extensive study of the governance
mechanisms of nineteenth century corporations.' As she has carefully
documented, the common law rule of one-vote-per-shareholder persisted well
into the nineteenth century.2 This is surprising because it seems to contradict
the usual alignment of wealth and economic power in a market-based economy.
Professor Dunlavy attributes the persistence of the one-vote-per-shareholder
rule to the social conception of the corporation in early nineteenth century
America as a "body politic" and to norms that treated shareholders more like
* Associate Professor of Economics and Law, Washington and Lee University. M.Phil.,
Ph.D., Yale University; J.D., University of Virginia; B.A., M.A., Carleton University. My
thanks to Eric Hilt for allowing me to cite his unpublished manuscript, "Corporate Ownership
and Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century."
1. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century
Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE
AMERICA 66, 68 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia, eds., 2004) (discussing the four
elements of Dunlavy's analysis of nineteenth century corporate governance).
2. See id. (discussing the emergence of plutocratic voting rights in the 1850s).
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citizens in an egalitarian polity than modem-day investors in a profit-making
business venture.
There is no disputing Professor Dunlavy's facts-the one-vote-per-
shareholder rule was much more prevalent at the start of the nineteenth century
than it was at the end of it-but one might demur at her explanation. This
Comment suggests an alternative view: The persistence of the one-vote-per-
shareholder rule in the early nineteenth century and the transition to one-vote-
per-share by the end of the nineteenth century may have had more to do with
the economic purpose of the corporation than with the early nineteenth century
social conception of the corporation as a body politic. Indeed, from this
perspective the social conception of the nineteenth century corporation was
bound up with its economic purpose, and it changed as the economic purpose
and function of the corporation evolved.
I. The Corporation as a Market Institution
The corporation is a market institution and, like all market institutions, it is
a social construct with important social, political, and moral implications.
Corporations make decisions that affect the allocation of scarce economic
resources, the distribution of income, domestic political outcomes, and the
scope of human rights. They decide, for instance, how much steel to buy, how
many SUVs to produce, how to finance their employees' retirement plans,
whether to outsource customer service operations, and whether to transact with
suppliers that use child labor. In spite of all the important social and political
implications, they do not make their decisions democratically, at least not as the
term is commonly understood. Indeed, as Professor Dunlavy points out, under
the one-vote-per-share rule that predominates in the United States today,
decision-making power among the shareholders of the corporation is distributed
quite plutocratically. 4 In theory, a shareholder's voting power is in proportion
to her property rights in the corporation; the larger her stake, the greater her
influence.5
Of course, it is well known that in most public corporations today
6shareholders exercise little control over the directors and senior executives.
3. See id. at 67-68 (discussing the democratic nature of early nineteenth century
corporate governance).
4. See id. at 67 (stating that modem corporations base shareholder power on the amount
of capital invested).
5. See id. (discussing the relationship between capital investment and shareholder
control).
6. Indeed, the modem debate about the scope of shareholder democracy is more
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Under state corporation statutes, responsibility for the management of the
corporation is vested in the board of directors.7 In practice, the board of
directors necessarily delegates many decisions to the senior executives and is
usually dependent on the senior executives for most of the information that it
uses in making any other decisions.8 Unless they happen to own a controlling
stake, shareholders thus usually have little, if any, influence over the
corporations in which they own shares. In fact, most stock investors today hold
a diversified portfolio of stocks and other financial assets, and it would be
almost impossible for them to acquire the knowledge and expertise in all of the
various facets of the business activities that their corporations engage in for
them to participate in any meaningful way in corporate decision-making. Most
shareholders are in fact quite content to leave corporate decisions to the
directors and senior executives of the corporation.
Of course, in theory, the shareholders could always coalesce around an
issue or cause and exercise some control over the corporation through their
power to elect or remove directors.9 And decisions that effect fundamental
corporate changes, such as the decision to merge with another company,
liquidate assets, or change the corporate charter usually do require a
shareholder vote.10 Moreover, the management may submit some of their
decisions for shareholder approval regardless of whether they are strictly
required to do so by the state's corporation laws."' But for the most part,
shareholders do not exercise much influence over corporate decisions, and they
do not appear to have much interest in doing so. In practice, the modem
American corporation is even less democratic than the one-vote-per-share rule
suggests.
In that regard, the corporation is no different from other market
institutions. All market institutions are social constructs, and the delegation of
social decisions to markets always has political consequences. 12 Indeed, there
concerned with the accountability of corporate managers to their shareholders than with the
distribution of voting power among shareholders.
7. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcoNoMics 9 (2002) (stating
that the operation of corporations are generally vested by statute in the board of directors).
8. See id. (discussing the delegation of managerial decisions).
9. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 7.28, 8.08 (2003) (discussing the procedures by
which shareholders elect or remove corporate directors).
10. See id. §§ 10.03, 11.04, 12.02 (2003) (outlining the voting power of shareholders).
11. See BAiNBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 441 (pointing out that the vast majority of corporate
decisions are made by the directors or senior executives).
12. There are basically two ways of organizing social decision-making: one is by
delegating decision-making power to the individual participants in private market transactions,
and the other is through the command and routine of government bodies and bureaucracies.
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is an inveterate strain of libertarian thought that views the delegation of social
decisions to markets as necessary to protect individual liberties against the
tyrannies of the collective decision-making processes of governments. Milton
and Rose Friedman, for instance, have famously argued that governments tend
to be controlled by special interests and that their actions are often confounded
by misaligned bureaucratic incentives and inadvertent bureaucratic
incompetence.' 3 Moreover, their decisions typically constrain and bind all,
without exception.14 Thus, an individual voter cannot exempt herself from a
draft, or opt out of the tax obligations of a new Medicaid prescription drug
benefit, or decline to participate in the social security system. From a
libertarian perspective, delegating decisions to the market (in these examples,
by choosing to have voluntary armed forces and private health care and pension
systems) frees individuals from the tyranny of special interests and the
incompetence and indifference of government bureaucrats and widens the
scope of personal liberties.
15
Delegating social decisions to markets also has important economic
consequences. Most economists are wont to argue that it is much more
efficient to delegate decisions over the allocation of scarce social resources to
private individuals acting on their own initiative and in accordance with their
own preferences in decentralized markets rather than to make them through the
collective decision-making process of government.' 6 Indeed, in the light of
recent world history even some left-leaning critics of capitalism have conceded
that markets are often highly efficient. 17 To paraphrase Robert Heilbroner, we
live in the age of the triumph of capitalism, and markets play a central role in a
capitalist economy.'
8
13. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
115-19 (1980) (discussing the effects of special interest groups on government spending).
14. See CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 65 (1977) (describing governments,
or "authority systems," as having "strong thumbs, [but] no fingers").
15. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 298-301 (advocating an "economic"
Bill of Rights).
16. The First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics states that a "Walrasian"
equilibrium (a free market equilibrium that satisfies the conventional economic assumptions) is
"Pareto" efficient. See HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 191-203 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing the Pareto efficiency of a competitive equilibrium). Thus, it would be impossible to
reallocate resources in such a way that any one person could be made better off without at least
one other person being made worse off. Id.
17. See Robert Heilbroner, The Triumph of Capitalism, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 23, 1989,
at 98 (acknowledging that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformation of Eastern Europe
at the end of the twentieth century was, at its heart, a rejection of central planning in favor of the
market).
18. See id. (discussing the growth of democracy and the importance of the market
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But markets are also highly plutocratic. In a free market, the buyer with
the most purchasing power has the most influence over what gets produced and
who gets to consume it.19 Individual consumers decide whether they are going
to buy a summer house, drive a Ferrari, or give to the local food bank.
Obviously, a wealthy person's decisions have a much bigger impact on the
allocation of resources than a poor person's, and for the most part, the rich and
wealthy choose to exercise their economic power primarily for their own
benefit. But since markets are inherently plutocratic, and since the corporation
is a market institution, how could the corporation ever have been anything less
than plutocratic? If market mechanisms were just as plutocratic in the early
nineteenth century as today, why should the corporation have been any less so?
II. Democracy and the Social Meaning of the Nineteenth-
Century Corporation
As Professor Dunlavy and others have documented, the corporation was
not always as plutocratic as we might have expected--or at least, it did not
always appear to be as plutocratic as we might have expected. Shareholder
voting rules in the American corporation appeared to be much more democratic
at the start of the nineteenth century than they are today.20 Professor Dunlavy
focuses on the transition from one-vote-per-shareholder to one-vote-per-share to
put corporate governance in a historical perspective.21 From her vantage point,
corporate decision-making became less democratic and more plutocratic as the
nineteenth century unfolded.22
But if we are going to try to understand the social meaning of the
transition from one-vote-per-shareholder to one-vote-per-share, we should also
put the social meaning of democracy in historical perspective. The
fundamental fabric of American social, political, and economic life changed
economy).
19. One of the implications of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
that very different Pareto efficient allocations of resources can be achieved through alternative
distributions of initial property rights. See VARIAN, supra note 16, at 191-203 (explaining
Pareto efficiency).
20. See Dunlavy, supra note 1, at 72-76 (discussing the impact of democratic ideals on
corporate governance in the early nineteenth century).
21. See id. at 67 (stating that early nineteenth-century norms "tended to treat shareholders
more like citizens in a relatively egalitarian polity").
22. See id. at 86-87 ("The power of the small shareholder declined" and "the corporation
appeared more private than public and... the multitude of stockholders seemed more like
passive investors than citizens of the corporate polity.").
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quite dramatically during the nineteenth century.2 3 Ironically, if we track the
evolution of the American people's voting rights through the nineteenth
century, the United States appeared to become much more democratic rather
than less. In fact, in the early nineteenth century American society appeared to
be highly plutocratic at precisely the time when the corporation appeared to be
more democratic.
Most black Americans in the early nineteenth century were slaves. It was
not until the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
ratified in 1870 that black men were given any kind of constitutional right to
vote, and even then it was only in federal elections. 4 Moreover, in the years
after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, most Southern states enacted poll
taxes and other voter qualifications that effectively disenfranchised most black
males.25 These poll taxes and voter qualifications also disenfranchised some
poor white males and recent white male immigrants.26 Indeed, most Eastern
states had some form of property qualification that restricted the voting rights of
poor white males even before the Civil War; voting rights were usually broader
in the western states and territories, but possibly only because problems with
land titles made property qualifications difficulty to administer. 27 Poll taxes
and other property qualifications were not made unconstitutional in federal
elections until the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1964, and they
23. This may sound like a platitude, since any nation must surely change in significant
ways over the course of an entire century, but the United States changed in much more
fundamental ways during the nineteenth century than the twentieth century. Consider some of
the important changes: fundamental developments in constitutional law (e.g., the power of
judicial review), the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, westward expansion, the canals
and railroads, and the Second Industrial Revolution.
24. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & MARK V. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 847-48 (1996) (discussing the history of suffrage in the United States).
It is interesting to note that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
automatically confer a constitutional right to vote on black males. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 2. In fact, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment acknowledged that states might use voter
qualifications to limit adult males' voting rights and specified a scheme for reducing their
representation in Congress for doing so. Id.
25. In addition to poll taxes, some of the Southern states also enacted literacy and
residency requirements that disenfranchised many black males. Black males may have been
even more effectively disenfranchised in the years immediately after the Civil War, however, by
white-on-black electoral violence and intimidation. See RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two
RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 91-96, 123-31 (2004)
(discussing the various techniques used to keep black voters away from the polls during
Reconstruction).
26. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAw 30 (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing the impact of secret ballots on poor and illiterate whites).




were not made unconstitutional in state elections until Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections,28 in 1966, in which the Supreme Court held that poll taxes
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
White women did not have the right to vote in any part of the country until
the territory of Wyoming extended them suffrage in 1869.30 Colorado was the
first state to grant women suffrage in 1893.3  And it was not until the
Nineteenth Amendment's ratification in 1920 that women had a constitutional
right to vote. Perhaps not coincidentally, the expansion in women's voting
rights through the nineteenth century was correlated with an expansion in their
property rights. Under the common law that prevailed in all states at the start of
the nineteenth century, a woman's husband acquired a right to possess and
transfer her real property as soon as they were married.32 The common law was
not displaced until the states enacted various versions of the Married Women's
Property Act.33 Mississippi was the first state to do so in 1839; the other states
enacted similar statutes throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century.
34
But even these still delegated married women to subordinate domestic roles.35
28. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
29. See id. at 666 ("[A] State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard."). Harper did not confer a constitutional right to vote in state elections, it merely
declared that voter qualifications based on wealth violate the equal protection clause. Id.; see
also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) ("[W]e would reject ... the holding that any
interference with an opportunity to elect a representative of one's choice would be sufficient to
allege or make out an equal protection violation."). Interestingly, the Court has upheld property
qualifications where they are narrowly tailored to meet the purposes of government units with
limited spheres of authority. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981) (upholding a
property qualification in elections for directors of a water reclamation district in Arizona);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973)
(upholding a property qualification in water storage district elections in California).
30. See Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the Right to Vote: 1787-1965, in
VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: CONTINUING THE QUEST FOR FULL PARTICIPATION 25, 32 (Karen
McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor, eds., 1992) (discussing the emergence of women's
suffrage in the United States).
31. See id. (discussing the spread of suffrage throughout the states). By then Wyoming
had also become a state. Colorado was followed by Utah and Idaho in 1896. Id. Even by the
time the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified by Congress, however, only twenty states had
extended the franchise to women. Id.
32. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 383-84 (5th ed. 2002)
(discussing women's property rights under the common law).
33. See id. at 384 (stating that the Married Women's Property Act preempted state
common law).
34. See id. (discussing the history of the Married Women's Property Act).
35. See id. ("The Married Women's Property Acts... did not give the wife full
equality.").
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The task of achieving full equality for women has largely been left to private
litigants and the courts.36
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore, both women
and blacks were denied both property rights and voting rights. Some white
males who lacked property were also denied voting rights. In the latter half of
the nineteenth century, poll taxes and other voter qualifications were used to
disenfranchise black males; they also disenfranchised some poor white males.
With a few exceptions, primarily at the end of the nineteenth century, states
continued to deny women suffrage until the twentieth century. By any standard
of comparison, therefore, American society was highly plutocractic in the early
nineteenth century. There was an emerging ideology rooted in Puritan values
and natural rights theories that emphasized political equality and this may well
have helped to advance the idea of universal suffrage,37 but universal suffrage
remained an idea rather than a fact until well into the twentieth century.
The social meaning of the corporation no doubt changed in important
ways during the nineteenth century, but so, obviously, did the social meaning of
democracy. Ironically, the United States in general appeared to be far more
plutocratic and much less democratic at a time when the corporation appeared
to be more democratic and less plutocratic. Indeed, against the social and
political background of early nineteenth century America, it is remarkable that
the corporation appeared to be so democratic. But was the corporation of the
early nineteenth century really all that much more democratic than the
corporation today? And to the extent that it was, was this really because the
emerging democratic values of the nineteenth century pervaded the conduct of
business?
IV. Shareholder Voting Rights and the Economic Purpose of the
Corporation
We have very little systematic evidence about early nineteenth century
corporate governance, so these questions are difficult to answer. One recent
study by Eric Hilt, however, implies that the early nineteenth century
corporation may not have been nearly as democratic as Professor Dunlavy
36. See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2130 (1994) (discussing the courts' role in
reforming women's rights statutes in the nineteenth century).
37. See LowEsTEN & HASEN, supra note 26, at 27 (discussing the effect of private
litigation on the evolution of women's rights).
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suggests.38 Hilt has compiled a data set using the records collected by the state
of New York from 1825-1828 in administering a capital tax that it
implemented in 1823 and from the state's grants of corporate charters. 39 From
the records he was able to obtain, he inferred that, on average, early nineteenth
century corporations in New York had only about 72 shareholders, and that a
majority of the shares was usually held by the ten largest shareholders.40
Moreover, most of the shareholders were residents of the same county as the
corporation a.4  On average, only ten percent of the shares were held by out-of-
42state owners. As Hilt observes, many charters were granted to corporations
that either never began operations or soon failed and ceased operations.43 Of
the corporations that remained in operation in 1827, over 60% of them were
governed under a one-vote-per-share rule,44 and another 32% were governed
under a graduated voting rule;45 less than six percent were governed under the
common law rule of one-vote-per-shareholder.46
38. See Eric Hilt, Corporate Ownership and Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century,
(Apr. 2006) (analyzing the ownership and voting structures of corporations in New York state in
the early nineteenth century) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
39. See id. at 6-7 (discussing the sources of Hilt's statistical analysis).
40. Id. at 10 (finding that, on average, the largest shareholder controlled 25% of the
shares).
41. Id. at 11 ("[A]bout two-thirds of the shares were typically owned within the
corporation's county.").
42. Id. Perhaps not surprisingly, a significant percentage of the shares were usually held
by owners in New York City, even for firms located in other counties.
43. See id. at 13 (discussing the disproportionately high rate of failure among
corporations).
44. Bainbridge notes that the early nineteenth century corporation may have been much
more plutocratic than these figures suggest. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 451 (suggesting
that large shareholders were able to circumvent restrictions on their voting power by transferring
their shares to straw men who would vote as directed). This practice apparently dated back to
the eighteenth century and was legal unless proscribed by statute. Id. at 451 n.2 1.
45. See Hilt, supra note 38, at 16 (noting that under graduated voting rules, shareholders
usually had one vote per share up to some amount and then less that one vote per share
thereafter). The total number of votes per shareholder might also be capped. Id.
46. A one-vote-per-shareholder rule was specified in only 1.8% of the corporate charters,
but 4.1% of the charters did not specify any voting rule. Id. Since the common law default rule
was one-vote-per-shareholder, these additional firms may also have been governed under that
rule, although, as Hilt points out, some of them may have specified alternative voting rules in
their bylaws. See id. (discussing corporations' use of alternative voting rights in corporate
bylaws). Although the New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently held that the common law rule
could not be superseded by corporate bylaws in Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1834), the New York courts never addressed the question and New York corporations may have
used their bylaws to specify shareholder voting rights both before and after Taylor.
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Perhaps most interesting of all, Hilt notes that there was a significant
difference in shareholder voting rules across different types of corporations. 7
Over 90% of the corporations engaged in manufacturing or insurance adopted a
one-vote-per-share rule;48 while, only three percent of the corporations formed
to construct and operate turnpikes adopted a one-vote-per-share rule.49 The
one-vote-per-share rule was also adopted by only 50% of the corporations
formed to construct and operate bridges.50 This is significant because there
were important differences in the economic purposes of these corporations.
In the early nineteenth century, turnpikes and bridges were essentially
local public goods. Between about 1790 and 1820 the population of New York
roughly tripled in size and so did the demand for transportation infrastructure.5'
There was widespread opposition to providing new public turnpikes and
bridges because people believed that this would result in tax increases.
52
Franchise corporations were thus formed to finance and build the turnpikes and
bridges as an alternative to financing and building them publicly.53 These
franchise corporations therefore fulfilled a public purpose. As Alfred Chandler
has observed, early nineteenth-century merchants viewed them as "private
enterprise in the public interest. 5 4  Indeed, the charters of the franchise
corporations typically regulated the conduct of their business in some detail,
and the corporations rarely yielded profits for their shareholders. 55 Profits were
not the real objective: the real objective was to provide a public good.
47. See Hilt, supra note 38, at 18 (discussing the differences in voting rights across
various industries).
48. See id. at 18. Hilt notes that New York enacted a general incorporation statute in
1811 that set a default rule of one-vote-per-share. Id. at 4 (discussing the New York statute).
However, some manufacturing firms continued to incorporate through special acts of the
legislature. Moreover, this was only a default rule and so they were free to specify an
alternative in their certificate of incorporation. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 451
(discussing the latitude in incorporation under the New York incorporation statute).
49. See Hilt, supra note 38, at 18 (providing a statistical analysis of the corporate
governance mechanisms used by various industries in the early nineteenth century).
50. See id. (providing comparative statistical analyses of various industries' choices of
corporate governance).
51. See NATHAN MILLER, THE ENTERPRISE OF A FREE PEOPLE; ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK STATE DURING THE CANAL PERIOD, 1792-1868 4 (1962)
(discussing the growth and expansion of New York City between 1790 and 1820).
52. See id. at 9 (discussing the resistance to the construction of public infrastructure).
53. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VistLE HAND 28 (1977) (discussing the growth of
private corporations as alternatives to public works projects).
54. Id. According to Chandler, the use of franchise corporations to build turnpikes was
common in all of New England and the middle states until later in the nineteenth century. Id. at
34.
55. See Hilt, supra note 38, at 13 (discussing the initial charters of early franchise
1416
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The majority of the shareholders of the franchise corporations were
typically local residents and merchants who stood to benefit from the new
bridge or turnpike. 56 Given the public purpose of the franchise corporations it
is hardly surprising that they typically featured more democratic governance
provisions. The precise location chosen for a bridge or turnpike could have had
a major impact on the distribution of its benefits. Under a one-vote-per-share
rule, a small minority of shareholders could have used their control of the
corporation in their own interests and to the detriment of the majority. Hilt thus
suggests that the New York legislature favored some qualification of the one-
vote-per-share rule in the charters of the franchise corporations as a check
against the abuse of the public interest for which the corporations were
formed.
57
It is interesting to contrast the franchise corporations in Hilt's sample with
the manufacturing corporations. One of the surprising results of Hilt's study
was the particularly high rate of failure for manufacturing corporations-over
70% during the period of his sample. 58  This probably explains why the
manufacturing corporations were generally closely held by a relatively small
number of shareholders. It also suggests why the one-vote-per-share rule was
the norm for manufacturing corporations, since this would have facilitated tight
control and aligned decision-making power with the size of shareholders'
stakes and their exposure to the risks. The failure rate for franchise
corporations was also high but only because of the difficulty of acquiring land
and the protracted litigation that sometimes resulted from the efforts to do so.59
The franchise corporations did not need to make nearly as many important
investment and managerial decisions as the manufacturing corporations. Thus,
the scope of more "democratic" shareholder voting rights seems to have been
limited not only to those corporations that served a clearly defined public
corporations). In fact, in 1807 a law was enacted which standardized these provisions. Id. at 5.
56. See id. at 13 (discussing the benefit to local businesses that resulted from new
construction).
57. See id. at 18 (discussing the risk of a private shareholder using his voting power for
personal gain rather than fulfillment of a public good). The regulations appeared to have the
intended effects: Although the franchise corporations were on average much smaller than
manufacturing corporations, they also had more shareholders and more shareholders were
required for majority control. See id. at 12 (comparing the shareholder makeup and voting
power of franchise corporations and manufacturing corporations).
58. See id. at 13 (showing that of 237 manufacturing charters granted prior to 1827, only
62 resulted in an operating corporation in 1827).
59. See id. at 13 (discussing the challenges franchise corporations faced in formation and
continued viability)
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interest, but also to those in which the exercise of shareholder voting rights was
less important to recouping a return on the shareholder's investment.
The relative prevalence of the one-vote-per-shareholder rule and
qualifications of the one-voter-per-share rule in the early nineteenth century
may thus have had more to do with the economic purpose and function of the
nineteenth century corporation than they did with any social conception of the
justness of power relations between investors. The social meaning of the
corporation was no doubt very different then than it is now, but perhaps in large
part because its economic purpose was often different. As the nineteenth
century proceeded, local and state governments increasingly began to displace
franchise corporations as the providers of transportation infrastructure.6 ° As the
relative number of franchise corporations diminished, the one-vote-per-share
rule quickly became prevalent.61 In Hilt's sample, turnpike corporations
accounted for over 80% of all new corporate charters at the start of the
nineteenth century, but less than 20% of new charters by 1825. Manufacturing
corporations, on the other hand, were rare at the start of the nineteenth century,
but accounted for over 20% of new charters by 1825.62 By 1825, over 80% of
the new corporate charters in New York were for corporations that were
governed under a one-vote-per-share rule.
V. Conclusion
The social meaning of the corporation no doubt changed quite
dramatically during the nineteenth century, but so did its economic purpose and
function. At the start of the nineteenth century the corporation was usually
created through a special act of the state legislature. It often had a sphere of
monopoly power and was thought to be a privilege conferred upon the firms'
owners by the state legislature. It often served as a means of pooling the
finances of a limited number of investors and securing limited liability for a
profit-making business venture. But it also commonly had a clear public
purpose; in fact, at the start of the nineteenth century the corporation was
commonly used to pool the finances of local residents and merchants for the
60. See CHANDLER, supra note 53, at 34 (discussing the re-emergence of state-sponsored
infrastructure construction).
61. See Hilt, supra note 38, at 19 (showing the increase of the one-vote-per-share rule as
franchise corporations became less prevalent).
62. See id. (providing a statistical analysis of industrial composition among charters
issued between 1800 and 1825).
63. See id. (providing a statistical analysis of the voting rights present in all corporate
charters issued between 1800 and 1825).
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purpose of providing local public goods, particularly turnpikes and bridges.
The persistence of the one-vote-per-shareholder rule into the nineteenth century
probably had much to do with the use of the franchise corporation for the
provision of these local public goods. As the nineteenth century proceeded,
local and state governments increasingly began to replace the franchise
corporations in fulfilling this function, and the role of the corporation changed.
Indeed, as the nineteenth century unfolded and the canals and railroads
connected the far reaches of the country in a national transportation network,
the market for many commodities and manufactured products became national
in scope. With the potential size of their markets so vastly expanded,
companies began to adopt new technologies that allowed them to realize
enormous economies of scale and produce new and better products at lower
costs. Because the new technologies required larger capital investments, and
because the investments were often risky, business entrepreneurs needed better
ways of raising large amounts of capital without compromising their control of
the businesses. The common law rule of one-vote-per-shareholder clearly
would have impeded the growth of these new mass-production industries, and
so it is no surprise that it had faded long before the end of the nineteenth
century.
But it is doubtful whether the corporation was ever truly democratic in any
important sense. The persistence of the one-vote-per-shareholder rule in the
early nineteenth century probably had more to do with the public purpose
served by the franchise corporations than with any emerging nineteenth century
political ideology or social norms. Further research will no doubt help to
clarify exactly how important democratic values were to the governance of the
nineteenth century corporation. But, in the end, the transition from one-vote-
per-shareholder to one-vote-per-share may prove to be interesting as much for
what it reveals about the forces that drive important changes in corporate law
and governance as for what it reveals about the social meaning of the
corporation. The lesson may well be that the social meaning of the corporation
derives from its economic purpose and function.
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